UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/358
21 May 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1996 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to our note dated 28 June 1995 (S/1995/522) and with reference to our note dated 13 July 1995 (S/1995/569) concerning the Eritrean Government's collusion in conspiracy and its involvement in an action hostile to the Sudan, I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to forward to you the annexed letter dated 13 May 1996 from Mr. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan.

I request you to have the annexed letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Suleiman Mohamed MUSTAFA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-12754 (E) 220596 220596 230596

/...

Annex

Letter dated 13 May 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. It is with deep regret and serious alarm that the Government of the Republic of the Sudan wishes to inform you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council for May 1996, that the Government of Eritrea is sponsoring and hosting so-called elements of the Sudanese armed resistance and the rebel movement in the southern Sudan, with a view to overthrowing the Government of the Sudan by armed force, thereby contravening all regional and international instruments governing the norms and principles of international relations, which enjoin respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs. The Eritrean Government persists in supporting these outlaw elements and encouraging their secessionist tendencies and continues to reveal its long-standing enmity towards the Sudan by escalating its policies of hostility to the Sudan.

2. The Sudan continues to take the view that it is important for the intentions of the Eritrean regime to be exposed and for the international community to be made aware of the Eritrean Government's repeated, persistent unlawful actions, as exemplified in its sponsoring and hosting the above-mentioned elements and providing them with military, communication and logistics facilities. It is for this reason that the Sudan drew the world's attention, through its letters of 28 June 1995 and 13 July 1995 (S/1995/522 and S/1995/569) to these practices, which are contrary to the most elementary rules of international behaviour.

3. The Sudan, which has sought to maintain a policy of self-control, desiring as it does to see peace, security and stability prevail in the region in particular and throughout Africa in general, refers to the renewed allegations that have been broadcast on the British Broadcasting Corporation's World Service concerning camps of the so-called "Sudanese alliance forces" in Eritrea. The BBC broadcast these allegations in a report carried on the "News Hour" programme on Friday, 10 May 1996. The salient features of that report were as follows:

(a) There are many training camps for elements of the so-called Sudanese resistance in Eritrea;

(b) The report presented a live recording of a military training operation for some of those elements in one such camp;

(c) In the course of the operation, the trainees fired at a picture of the President of the Sudanese National Council, Dr. Hasan Abdullah Al-Turabi;

(d) The leader of the so-called "alliance forces", Brigadier-General Abd Al-Aziz Khalid, stated in the course of the report's interview with him that their aim was to overthrow the Sudanese Government and that they had carried out military operations inside the Sudan from bases in Eritrean territory;

(e) The report alleged that the so-called Sudanese resistance had a radio transmitter in Eritrea;

(f) The programme included a recording of the voice of the President of Eritrea stating that Eritrea's support for the resistance movement that is working to overthrow the Sudanese Government was open-ended: "I would say the sky is the limit".

4. In view of the behaviour of the Eritrean regime, which has adopted a policy of aggression, hostility and fomenting crises in the region, engaging in such irresponsible actions as those described above and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries with a view to destabilizing them, jeopardizing their security and encroaching on their national sovereignty, it is clearly incumbent on the international community to enjoin the Eritrean regime to adhere to a responsible mode of conduct in its international relations and to abide by the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations.

5. The Eritrean regime will have to bear alone the consequences of its aggressive behaviour and its provocative actions, both open and secret, against the Sudan, since practices such as these can only serve to propel the region towards the danger of full-scale confrontation. The Sudan, while drawing the international community's attention to one particular instance of Eritrea's incessant conspiracies against it, stresses that the recent history of Eritrea since its independence has been filled with aggression, provocation and violations of international standards. The Sudan has no doubt that this must ultimately lead to increasing instability throughout the region.

6. The Government of the Sudan, which continues to affirm that it wholeheartedly desires good relations with all States, respecting their sovereignty and refraining from interference in their internal affairs, is saddened by the incessant series of aggressive acts directed against it by the Eritrean Government with a view to undermining its security, integrity and national unity and considers them to be hostile action incompatible with the international standards that should govern relations between States.

(Signed) Ali Osman Mohamed TAHA
Minister for Foreign Affairs

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/359
21 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the response of the Government of the Sudan to the statement by the Government of Uganda contained in Security Council document S/1996/288 of 16 April 1996 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its enclosure were circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hamid Ali ELTINAY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-12748 (E) 220596 230596

/...

Annex

Response of the Government of the Sudan to the statement by the Government of Uganda (S/1996/288, annex)

1. It was noticeable that the Government of Uganda was endeavouring to design its allegations against the Sudan in a manner that would match the interests of those who instigated and orchestrated the chorus to support their machinations in the Security Council to incriminate the Sudan. It is well known to all that the Government of Uganda is fighting civil wars against rebel movements not only in north Uganda, but also in central and eastern Uganda.

2. It is because of the unlimited and unconditional support that Uganda continues to render to the rebel movement in the southern Sudan (the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)) that the borders between the two countries are no longer under the control of the Government of the Sudan. To find pretexts and justifications for the military, logistic and political support for the rebel movement in the southern Sudan, the Government of Uganda has tended to attribute any incidents or attacks on its forces by the Ugandan rebels to the Government of the Sudan.

3. The military, logistic and political support of the Government of Uganda to the rebels of the SPLA has been authenticated even by the Western media, the last but not the least example of which was the report of The New York Times Magazine of 3 March 1996, which explicitly stated these facts. Moreover, the fact that the rebel leader John Garang of the SPLA in using Kampala as his headquarters stands alone as evidence for the Government of Uganda's conspiratory policies against the stability, territorial integrity and security of the Sudan. In addition to the provision of sanctuary and recruiting and training camps for the rebels, the Government of Uganda has continued to facilitate the channelling of military and financial assistance to the rebels from sources external and hostile to the Sudan.

4. The most flagrant and provocative act of aggression perpetrated by Uganda against the Sudan was its full-scale participation with men, tanks and artillery in invading Sudanese territory starting on 25 October 1995, with logistic support from certain neighbouring and external circles, which was videotaped and handed to the Government of Uganda. The invasion was directed against Farajuk and Magwe, causing loss of civilian life and property. It constituted a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territory integrity of the Sudan and of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Owing to the conspiracy of silence by some Powers, such aggression has passed uncondemned by those who continue to highlight the fabricated Ugandan allegations against the Sudan.

5. The activities of hostility against the Sudan by Uganda have not been confined to the prolongation of the civil war in the southern Sudan through its direct and indirect involvement. Uganda, in pursuing its machinations to destabilize the Sudan, has opted to make the Sudan a scapegoat for its internal differences and conflicts, while taking part in the orchestrated plot against the Sudan. This attitude from the side of Uganda was evidenced, in particular, when Uganda intentionally used to foil any initiative to normalize its relations

with the Sudan. When the Presidents of the Sudan and Uganda met in Vienna upon a kind initiative by the President of Austria in June 1994, Uganda did not honour the commitments it made in Vienna, thus leading to the termination of the Sudanese monitoring team in September 1994. Similarly, and only five days after the signing of the Tripoli Declaration for Normalization between the two countries on 5 April 1995, Uganda fabricated certain allegations as a pretext for expelling the Head of Mission of the Sudan in Kampala. The harassments of the Head and members of the Sudanese Mission were witnessed by the dean and members of the foreign diplomatic staff in an unprecedented manner and in flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. These acts of hostility culminated in the unilateral severing by Uganda of diplomatic relations with the Sudan on 23 April 1995. Later and upon the kind initiative of the President of Malawi to prevent the escalation of tension between the two countries, the President of the Sudan met with the President of Uganda in Blantyre and agreed on a communiqué on 11 June 1995 in which it was agreed that a multilateral monitoring team would be composed by the two countries in addition to Malawi to verify any claims impeding the normalization of relations. Uganda's attitude continued to be negative. It resorted to delaying the work of the team by not presenting the names of its representatives on the team and failed to show up at two meetings of the team, the latest of which was scheduled for 14 and 15 February 1996.

6. The active participation of Uganda in the hostile campaign against the Sudan by its note contained in document S/1996/288 of 16 April 1996 and in the deliberations of the Security Council concerning the adoption of its resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996, despite the declaration of the summit of the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development in Nairobi on 1 March 1996, were a matter of disappointment to the Sudan. At that summit the Heads of State and Government of the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority committed themselves to solving current problems and conflicts in the subregion as a prerequisite for its development and prosperity. However, it seems that Uganda has opted to continue to play the role assigned to it by external forces in destabilizing the region without any consideration for the aspirations and efforts of the region towards achieving peace, security, prosperity and development.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/360
21 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the letter of 10 April 1996 to your predecessor as president of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations (S/1996/269). The letter refers to two newspaper articles about a documentary programme shown recently on British television. Woman Police Constable Yvonne Fletcher was murdered on 17 April 1984 outside the Libyan diplomatic mission in St. James' Square, London, by shots from a gun fired from a window of that mission. The television programme contained speculation that the shots might have come from elsewhere in the Square. The Libyan letter treats the speculations in the programme as fact. The truth is as follows.

Following the murder of Constable Fletcher, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya refused to cooperate in a criminal investigation or to allow its diplomatic mission to be searched. Instead it proposed that a Libyan mission of inquiry should come to the United Kingdom, and that any Libyan found to be implicated should be put on trial in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The United Kingdom regarded this as a totally inadequate response to the killing of a British citizen carried out in broad daylight on the streets of London, and accordingly broke off diplomatic relations with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. At the inquest held by a coroner, the evidence given led to the jury deciding that Constable Fletcher was unlawfully killed by a bullet coming from one of two first floor windows at the front of the Libyan People's Bureau.

The Libyan Government has maintained its refusal to accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, to tender an apology or pay compensation to Constable Fletcher's family. In 1991 the United Kingdom Police Dependents' Trust received a cheque for £250,000 from the Libyan Police syndicate in connection with the murder, but the Trust declined to accept it.

It is unacceptable that the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ignores the facts about the murder of Constable Fletcher, which were made clear at the inquest. It is also unacceptable that it should seek to use the speculative comments in a television programme to cast doubt on the evidence on which the charges are based against the two Libyans in respect

of the murder of 270 people at Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1988. The letter will do nothing for the cause of confidence in relations between the United Kingdom and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Rather the reverse.

I am requesting that you have my letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) John WESTON

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/361
21 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1996 FROM THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 20 May 1996.

(Signed) Zbigniew Maria WLOSOWICZ
Acting Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait

96-12731 (E) 210596 220596

/...

Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, 1/ for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the twentieth report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines. The preceding reports were submitted on 13 September 2/ and 10 December 1991, 3/ 12 March, 4/ 11 June, 5/ 8 September 6/ and 4 December 1992, 7/ 19 March, 8/ 7 June, 9/ 7 September 10/ and 13 December 1993, 11/ 4 March, 12/ 6 June, 13/ 2 September 14/ and 29 November 1994, 15/ 1 March, 16/ 31 May, 17/ 25 August 18/ and 27 November 1995 19/ and 21 February 1996. 20/

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, no official communication containing such information as requested by paragraph 12 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee. However, there has been some information gathered from published sources concerning alleged violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, which have been circulated to Committee members for their information.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e., items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), the Security Council adopted, on 27 March 1996, resolution 1051 (1996) on the establishment of an export/import mechanism for monitoring future sales or supplies to Iraq of dual-use items which could assist Iraq in the production or acquisition of proscribed weapons. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come

to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. Further to the transparency measures adopted in 1995, as recommended by the Security Council, the Committee decided at its 132nd and 134th meetings, on 1 February and 1 March 1996, respectively, that its Chairman would give an oral briefing to all interested Members of the United Nations and the press, respectively after each meeting, about the work of the Committee.

7. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991, 21/ no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Notes

1/ S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23279.

4/ S/23708.

5/ S/24083.

6/ S/24545.

7/ S/24912.

8/ S/25442.

9/ S/25930.

10/ S/26430.

11/ S/26874.

12/ S/1994/274.

13/ S/1994/695.

14/ S/1994/1027.

15/ S/1994/1367.

16/ S/1995/169.

17/ S/1995/442.

18/ S/1995/744.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/362
21 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SEVENTEENTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January 1996, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 31 May 1996. The report provides an update on developments in Liberia since my report of 1 April 1996 (S/1996/232) and contains recommendations concerning the future role of UNOMIL in Liberia.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. The deterioration of the peace process in Liberia throughout the first months of the year, as described in my last report, culminated on 6 April in the eruption of fighting in Monrovia. In my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 22 April (S/1996/312), I described the widespread looting and complete breakdown of law and order which ensued. Despite a short lull, hostilities have continued since 6 April, seriously jeopardizing the Abuja peace process.

Genesis of the crisis

3. While the fighting was sparked off by the attempted arrest of General Roosevelt Johnson, the leader of a wing of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-J), the underlying causes are much deeper. Skirmishes between Alhaji Kromah's and General Johnson's wings of ULIMO and between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) have recently created discord among members of the Council of State. As large numbers of fighters came into Monrovia, purportedly to protect their leaders, security in the city deteriorated. At the same time, the Council of State seemed determined to assert itself in ways contrary to the spirit of the Abuja Agreement, reportedly against the advice of some of its own members. It adopted protocols under which the transitional Government would be called "the Government of Liberia" and the Council of State the "collective presidency." Mr. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah began referring to their forces as

"government forces", as they went into the ULIMO-J strongholds of Kakata and Tubmanburg in mid-March, asserting that they were helping the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to maintain security in those areas. These events created fear that some Liberian leaders were sidestepping the transitional arrangements and processes provided for under the Abuja Agreement.

4. It was in this volatile atmosphere that on 23 March, following confrontations between rival groups within ULIMO-J, the transitional Government issued a warrant for the arrest of General Roosevelt Johnson, accusing him of the murder of a man found dead on his property. General Johnson refused to turn himself over and, on 6 April, the Rapid Reaction Unit of the national police, backed up by the forces of NPFL and General Alhaji Kromah's Wing of ULIMO (ULIMO-K), attempted to arrest him forcibly. They were attacked by General Johnson's forces, supported by fighters from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and LPC.

5. Detailed information about the fighting is contained in section III and annex I to the present report.

Meeting of the Economic Community of West African States

6. The ECOWAS Committee of Nine met at Accra on 7 May to explore ways to achieve a cessation of hostilities and the reactivation of the peace process. Councilmen Taylor and Kromah failed to attend the meeting, and both indicated that the Chairman of the Council of State would represent the transitional Government. Councilmen Boley, Quiah and Tamba Tailor, as well as General Roosevelt Johnson and a number of NPFL ministerial appointees, attended the meeting. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, my Special Envoy, Mr. James O. C. Jonah, and my Special Representative, Mr. Anthony Nyakyi, were also present. In the meantime, Alhaji Kromah travelled to Abuja and other West African capitals to consult ECOWAS Governments on the situation in Liberia.

7. The ECOWAS Foreign Ministers adopted the Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement, under which they reaffirmed the Agreement as the only basis for peace in Liberia and agreed on a number of conditions to be fulfilled by the Liberian factions. These conditions include the restoration of the cease-fire; the withdrawal of fighters and the deployment of ECOMOG in Monrovia; the removal of arms from the city and the restoration of Monrovia as a safe haven; the guarantee of freedom of movement for civilians; the return of weapons taken from ECOMOG and vehicles and other equipment looted from UNOMIL, the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations; and the reactivation of the Cease-fire Violations Committee. ECOWAS decided to postpone the Summit until early August, indicating that its further involvement in Liberia would be reviewed at that time on the basis of progress made in fulfilling these conditions.

8. ECOWAS also decided that the protocols recently adopted by the Council of State declaring the transitional Government to be "the Government of Liberia" and the Council of State to be its "collective presidency" contradicted the spirit of the Abuja Agreement. ECOWAS stressed that the transitional Government

must be inclusive, and made clear its resolve not to recognize any Government that came to office through the use of force. In accordance with the ECOWAS conditions, General Johnson would be reinstated in his ministerial post and safe passage would be guaranteed for the withdrawal of fighters concentrated at the Barclay Training Centre to agreed areas outside Monrovia.

9. Discussions at the ECOWAS meeting also focused on the resource requirements of ECOMOG. Some countries expressed a willingness to contribute additional troops if financial resources were made available. They stressed that such resources should be provided to the force as a whole, unconditionally, and should cover not only logistic support but also reimbursement of payments to troops. Many Foreign Ministers expressed doubt, however, that significant resources would be forthcoming, given past experience in trying to raise funds for ECOMOG.

10. The ECOWAS Foreign Ministers welcomed the initiative of the Government of the United States of America in establishing an International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). That Contact Group, which met for the first time on 26 April at Geneva, brings together key donor Governments, the United Nations, ECOWAS, OAU and international agencies concerned with Liberia. During its meeting, ICGL identified three issues critical to peace in Liberia: restoring security in Monrovia, reinforcing ECOMOG, and encouraging the factions to return to the Abuja peace process.

11. The members of the Council of State have welcomed the recommendations made by ECOWAS Foreign Ministers and have stated that they will abide by them. General Johnson has also accepted the conditions set by ECOWAS and has indicated that he plans to return to Liberia. Even so, hostilities continue.

Visit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Liberia

12. On 18 April, my Special Envoy arrived in Monrovia to assess the future prospects of the peace process and the role the United Nations could play in that regard. While in Monrovia, he met the Chairman of the Council of State, representatives of ECOWAS and ECOMOG, and political, civic and faction leaders. On 5 May, he travelled to Accra where he met the Chairman of ECOWAS, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, General Johnson and other leaders. He also attended the meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on 7 and 8 May.

13. My Special Envoy's discussions focused on the continued validity of the Abuja Agreement in the light of recent events; the role of the Council of State; on prospects for conducting elections and restoring peace in Liberia; and the problems encountered by ECOMOG in carrying out its responsibilities in Liberia. Upon his return to New York, my Special Envoy briefed me, as well as the Security Council, on his findings. In particular, he emphasized the need for Monrovia to be restored as a safe haven and for the Council of State to work within the spirit envisaged under the Abuja Agreement. He also expressed the view that the restoration of peace and stability in Liberia would be a difficult process, given the deep mistrust between the factions.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

Nature and impact of the hostilities

14. During the first week after fighting broke out on 6 April, there was a complete breakdown of law and order in Monrovia. Fighters from all factions moved into the commercial district of the city, systematically looting stores and United Nations offices and warehouses. Reinforcements were brought in by the factions from outlying areas and fighters from all factions indiscriminately broke into houses, set buildings on fire, commandeered vehicles from the United Nations and private citizens and disarmed ECOMOG soldiers manning check-points. AFL and ULIMO-J stormed the prison and freed General Charles Julu and other detainees who had attempted a coup against the transitional Government in September 1994. The airport was attacked, apparently by ULIMO-J fighters, killing two ECOMOG soldiers and damaging two commercial aircraft, as well as the three ECOMOG helicopters financed by the United States.

15. Fighters quickly moved towards the Mamba Point area of Monrovia - where UNOMIL, the United States Embassy and many United Nations offices are located - apparently to seek out General Johnson, who was reportedly hiding in the area. It was not until 10 April that ECOMOG was able to provide some measure of security for UNOMIL offices. However, on 11 April, UNOMIL headquarters and other United Nations buildings in Mamba Point were forcibly occupied and looted by fighters from both sides, forcing nine military observers and civilian staff, as well as ECOMOG soldiers providing security there, to seek safety at the United States Embassy. Despite promises by Alhaji Kromah and Mr. Taylor to stop the looting, it continued unabated. All United Nations international personnel who were trapped in their homes and offices also safely found their way to the United States Embassy, from which the United States evacuated them to neighbouring countries, while local United Nations personnel moved to safe areas in other parts of the city. A temporary UNOMIL headquarters was established at the United Nations residential compound at Riverview, where my Special Representative and 19 civilian and 5 military personnel, including the Chief Military Observer, set up operations.

16. Many of the fighters engaged in the hostilities in Monrovia were under the age of 18 and seemed to operate with little organizational structure or control from their commanders. Some were clearly under the influence of drugs and alcohol. While hostilities continued, they roamed the streets in disorderly gangs, harassing civilians and sometimes squabbling among themselves over loot. The factions employed an assortment of weapons, including shoulder-fired rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and heavy machine guns. However, it appeared that few military tactics were employed, especially in the first days of the fighting. Firing was often inaccurate, providing little tactical advantage, but causing indiscriminate damage to property. Rocket-propelled grenades were used wantonly, mostly to help in the looting. At times, civilians were caught in the cross-fire. Throughout the fighting, the Barclay Training Centre was surrounded by a loose cordon of hostile fighters and subjected to shelling by NPFL and ULIMO-K forces. While the Training Centre experienced the heaviest fighting, it is believed that most fatalities in the barracks resulted from sickness and disease rather than hostile fire.

17. As fighting continued during the second week of the crisis, the factions began to establish control over certain areas of the city, which, for the most part, they still maintain. NPFL has established control over sections of eastern and central Monrovia, as well as the airport. ULIMO-K controls Bushrod Island up to and beyond the Po River, while ULIMO-J, LPC and AFL control the Barclay Training Centre barracks, some areas of central Monrovia and the eastern suburbs (see annex III). It should be noted, however, that the relative positions of the factions change daily owing to the constant infiltration of fighters and the urban nature of the hostilities. While fighting continues, it seems to be at a stalemate, with neither side able to take full control of the city.

18. In addition to Monrovia, fighting continues between the two wings of ULIMO in Tubmanburg. On 28 April, ULIMO-J forces attacked ECOMOG troops at Sinjie, killing one soldier and seriously wounding another. ECOMOG was not able to establish the reason for the attack. Skirmishes were also reported between NPFL and LPC forces in Grand Bassa, Sinoe, Grand Gedeh and Maryland counties. NPFL reportedly dislodged LPC from the city of Buchanan, but ECOMOG still maintains control of the city (see annex IV).

Deployment of UNOMIL

19. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Monrovia, UNOMIL military personnel were deployed in Monrovia, Buchanan, Kakata and Suehn (see annex IV). Following the outbreak of fighting, 88 of the Mission's 93 military observers were relocated to Freetown and Dakar, with the assistance of the United States Government. The military observers deployed to the field stations at Kakata and Suehn were escorted by ECOMOG to Monrovia on 13 April. Those at Buchanan returned to Monrovia by sea on 14 April on board an ECOMOG ship. Most of these military observers have now been repatriated. However, 10 remain on stand-by in Freetown and will return to Monrovia as soon as conditions permit. Five military observers (including the Chief Military Observer) remain in Monrovia to support the political efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis. Their tasks include monitoring military developments, patrolling the city (as security permits), convening meetings of the Cease-fire Violations Committee, which is chaired by UNOMIL and organizing security escorts for faction representatives participating in consultations to resolve the crisis.

Deployment of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

20. ECOMOG was not able to halt the hostilities when they erupted on 6 April. It maintained that the fighting was a matter between the factions and that it could not intervene in view of its limited manpower and resources, as well as the nature of its mandate as a peace-keeping force. Given these constraints, ECOMOG was also unable to provide protection for United Nations personnel and property. However, once ECOMOG received reinforcements from outlying areas, it assigned a security detail to the Riverview compound and for my Special Representative, as well as for the mediation team and some faction representatives involved in consultations to end the crisis.

21. While ECOMOG has been able to prevent ULIMO-J reinforcements from coming into Monrovia from the west across the Po River, it has not been able to deter

the massive movement of fighters in and out of the city centre from other areas. In accordance with the cease-fire arrangements that went into effect on 19 April, ECOMOG deployed in central Monrovia as fighters started to withdraw from the city, establishing check-points and undertaking patrols. Fighters continued to move freely, however, and when the cease-fire broke down on 29 April, ECOMOG withdrew to specific locations in sufficient numbers to deter attack from the factions. ECOMOG is currently deployed on Bushrod Island and maintains a presence at the telecommunications headquarters, the two bridges leading to the north and the airport. ECOMOG also maintains a presence at the seaport and around the Riverview compound.

22. Outside Monrovia, ECOMOG has continued to maintain its presence in Buchanan and Kakata. However, ECOMOG has completely withdrawn from Gbarnga, Bo, Tienne and Sinjie and reduced its strength in Buchanan and Kakata, to provide reinforcements for Monrovia.

23. ECOMOG has suffered a number of casualties since fighting resumed. It has taken risks and when possible it has tried to deter the fighting and ensure the safety of United Nations personnel. While reports have been received that some individual ECOMOG soldiers may have been involved in looting or may have provided arms to fighters, such actions were neither systematic nor a matter of policy. If they did occur, they may reflect the chronic lack of resources suffered by the force, all the way down to the foot soldier, who is expected to operate in a hostile environment without proper equipment and sometimes without having been paid for many weeks.

IV. SECURITY ASPECTS

24. With continued fighting, the security situation in Monrovia remains dangerous and unpredictable. During the first days of the crisis, United Nations staff members were placed in grave danger when they were forced from their homes and offices and robbed and harassed while seeking safety, and when the vehicles they were driving were hijacked. Some local United Nations staff displayed particular bravery in assisting United Nations international personnel to safety. All non-essential UNOMIL and United Nations agency personnel have now been relocated to neighbouring countries or repatriated. As noted earlier, ECOMOG is now providing security for United Nations personnel; however, because of chronic manpower and logistic constraints, it cannot guarantee their security at all times.

25. The most insecure areas of Monrovia remain the centre of the city and the eastern suburbs. The security situation at the port, which was not targeted during the hostilities, also remains tenuous. United Nations and non-governmental organization warehouses at the port have been looted on several occasions and fighters continue to roam the area. In addition, thousands of civilians have swarmed into the port to try to get on ships leaving the country, making the area extremely volatile. ECOMOG has recently increased its deployment in an effort to control the situation there.

26. While United Nations and international personnel have not themselves been targeted, the threat that their property, particularly vehicles, will be looted

remains high. There is also a risk that United Nations personnel could be caught in the cross-fire between opposing forces and that desperate fighters could once again resort to hostage-taking, as they did at the Barclay Training Centre. Given the persistent threat to the safety of United Nations personnel and overall insecurity in Monrovia, their movement remains restricted.

27. Developments in Monrovia are reviewed daily by UNOMIL and the United Nations designated official for security, with a view to ensuring the swift and safe relocation of United Nations personnel to neighbouring countries should security deteriorate further. Since the airport was destroyed during the fighting and remains closed, the only means of evacuating staff from Monrovia is either via the St. Paul River or by road to the port. Both routes present certain risks and are assessed daily.

Looting of United Nations equipment

28. As noted above, UNOMIL and all United Nations agencies have been systematically looted by fighters from all factions since 6 April. The fighters cleaned out all United Nations offices, damaged the buildings and looted United Nations warehouses. Some 80 per cent of UNOMIL vehicles were taken and many were destroyed. A large number of accoutrements bearing the United Nations insignia were stolen by fighters, who took to wearing the blue berets and other United Nations emblems. UNOMIL telephones, computers, photocopiers, communications equipment and general consumable items, including goods related to demobilization, were all looted. UNOMIL is currently estimating the value of looted goods and equipment. At least three months would be required to rebuild the Mission's logistic base.

29. My Special Representative has urged the faction leaders to ensure that the vehicles and equipment looted from UNOMIL, the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations are returned. The faction leaders have asserted that it would be difficult to retrieve the loot from the fighters. Even so, after UNOMIL received information that some United Nations equipment was loaded onto ships destined for certain West African ports, it requested the concerned Governments to assist the United Nations in retrieving the goods. Subsequently, some equipment, mostly small, marketable items, was retrieved. It is unlikely, however, that a substantial amount of equipment will be returned.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

30. Given the threatening security situation, UNOMIL has not been able to investigate actively the many reports of human rights violations committed during the hostilities, including rape, abductions, targeted killings of individuals and forced conscription. UNOMIL confirmed reports of two incidents when the heads of fighters were severed and displayed in the streets of Monrovia. The death toll among the civilian population has yet to be determined, but it is reported that a number of civilians have been killed, many as a result of the cross-fire.

31. Many civilian leaders were forced to leave Monrovia or to take refuge at the ECOMOG base, including the Chairman of the Council of State,

Wilton Sankawulo; Councilman Tamba Tailor; the Minister of Defence, General Hezekia Bowen; and the former President of the Interim Government for National Unity, Mr. Amos Sawyer. Once security conditions permit, UNOMIL will investigate reported human rights violations committed during the hostilities.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

32. The gains made in providing humanitarian assistance to those in need over the past several months appear to have been completely reversed by the recent hostilities. Over the past six weeks, more than half of Monrovia's 1.3 million citizens have been displaced. Many thousands have fled the country, often risking their lives to seek safety. At the same time, provision of assistance has been constrained by continued insecurity, the systematic looting of equipment and the evacuation of the majority of international relief personnel. Despite these conditions, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and other essential staff have remained in Monrovia to assess humanitarian needs and arrange the delivery of relief and assistance. The World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have also maintained skeleton staffs in Monrovia.

33. Assessments of the humanitarian impact of the fighting revealed concentrations of displaced persons in several locations, including about 20,000 people at the Greystone compound adjacent to the United States Embassy. Shortages of food and medicine, coupled with unsanitary conditions in these shelters, create the risk of outbreaks of infectious disease. Hospitals, while still functioning, are understaffed, badly in need of supplies and under constant security threat. WFP is implementing a targeted feeding programme that will cover 570,000 persons. It has commenced delivery of emergency food aid to critical locations, including Monrovia's 3 major hospitals and 31 shelters housing approximately 175,000 internally displaced persons.

34. Some international personnel from non-governmental organizations and donor countries began returning to Monrovia in mid-April and are working closely with UNICEF, WHO and the Ministry of Health in responding to emergency medical, water and sanitation requirements and in trying to contain the spread of infectious disease. These agencies also provided emergency medical assistance to those in need at the Barclay Training Centre.

35. Information on humanitarian conditions outside Monrovia is extremely limited. International relief and development organizations provided the majority of services to civilians prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The cessation of these activities as a result of the relocation of staff and looting of supplies, vehicles, and equipment, is expected to have a negative impact on relatively advanced efforts to restore some sections of the country to self-sufficiency. A few non-governmental organizations have, however, begun to resume cross-border delivery of assistance to areas in need.

36. The Liberian authorities, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have agreed to develop a three-month contingency plan for the

delivery of relief services, which will form the basis for an appeal to support these activities. There is, however, a consensus within the relief community that full-scale operations cannot recommence without the existence of credible security guarantees by the factions.

Situation of Liberian refugees

37. The outbreak of fighting shattered prospects for the imminent repatriation of more than 750,000 refugees, many of whom have been living in exile for more than six years. Moreover, the deteriorating security situation in Monrovia, hitherto considered a safe haven, is forcing thousands more Liberians to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, few countries in the subregion appear willing to accept additional refugees. The Bulk Challenger, a ship carrying nearly 2,000 Liberians, was stranded on the high seas for more than one week because no country in the region would let it dock. Reports indicate that the ship may have been carrying some armed fighters, as well as bona fide refugees. In the end, the Government of Ghana agreed to accept the refugees. UNHCR has appealed to the countries of the subregion to maintain their traditional open policy of asylum and to accept Liberians seeking refuge.

38. The efforts of UNHCR to promote self-sufficiency among the 123,000 refugees from Sierra Leone living in Liberia have been greatly affected by the fighting. A significant number of Sierra Leonean refugees trapped in Monrovia have expressed a strong desire to repatriate to their home country. UNHCR will provide assistance in this regard as soon as security conditions permit. Among the prospective repatriates are 75 unaccompanied minors who had been living at a shelter that was looted and taken over by fighters in mid-April.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

39. My proposed budgets for the financing of UNOMIL, covering the periods from 1 June 1996 to 30 June 1997 (A/50/650/Add.2 and 3) are currently before the General Assembly for consideration. It is estimated that the cost of maintaining UNOMIL at its currently authorized strength will be $1,603,500 gross for the month of June 1996, $3,553,700 gross for the month of July 1996 and $2,187,400 gross per month beginning 1 August 1996.

40. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIL at the reduced strength, as recommended in paragraph 49 below, the cost of maintaining the Observer Mission during the extension period will entail an adjustment to the monthly rates indicated above. It is, therefore, my intention to submit revised cost estimates to the General Assembly shortly for its consideration.

41. As of 9 May 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNOMIL since the inception of the Mission totalled $11.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 9 May 1996 amounted to $1,716 million.

42. Since my last report (S/1996/232), there have been no further voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for Liberia.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

43. Over the past six weeks, the faction leaders have clearly demonstrated their disregard for the aspirations of the Liberian people for peace. They have shown wanton disrespect for the United Nations, ECOWAS and the international community and have forced most international personnel to relocate to other countries.

44. The Liberian civil war has engaged ECOWAS for over six years. The West African States, themselves facing financial hardship, have spent millions of dollars, negotiated countless peace agreements and sacrificed the lives of their young men in trying to bring peace to Liberia. Hostilities have, on occasion, spilled over the borders, affecting the stability of Liberia's neighbours. In addition, the ECOWAS States, which have hosted Liberian refugees for a number of years, face the prospect of thousands more seeking refuge on their shores.

45. At their recent meeting at Accra, the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the Abuja Agreement as the only basis for peace in Liberia and agreed upon a number of steps necessary to resume its implementation. ECOWAS warned the faction leaders that if they did not implement those steps, it would reconsider its involvement in Liberia at its next summit meeting scheduled for early August 1996. The withdrawal of ECOMOG from Liberia could be catastrophic not only for the country but also for the subregion as a whole.

46. Should ECOWAS be compelled to take the decision to disengage from Liberia and withdraw ECOMOG, UNOMIL would have no choice but to do the same. Therefore, I strongly urge the Liberian faction leaders to consider carefully the wide-ranging consequences that their actions during the next two months will have and, in this light, to implement immediately the measures agreed upon by ECOWAS at Accra.

47. During the months leading up to the current crisis, the voice of Liberian civil society has, on many occasions, been stifled and journalists have even been detained for criticizing the actions of some members of the transitional Government. During their meeting at Accra on 7 May, the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers agreed that the transitional Government must be inclusive and that the Council of State must resume its work as envisaged under the Abuja Agreement. All Council members, who represent various sectors of Liberian society, should have a voice in the decision-making process. It is also necessary that ways and means be found to enable civil society to assume its rightful place in the peace process. In this connection, I have requested my Special Representative to encourage greater input into the political process from a broad spectrum of civilian leaders and to continue to urge the transitional Government to restore the atmosphere necessary for the democratic process to flourish and for the media to resume its work.

48. In the absence of functioning institutions to organize the electoral process, and given the continued instability, it is most unlikely that elections could be held in August 1996, as provided for under the Abuja Agreement. The future of the electoral process, at least one that could be supported by the international community, will depend on the restoration of basic conditions of

peace and security and on the resumption of the implementation of the Abuja Agreement.

49. In its resolution 1020 (1995), the Security Council mandated UNOMIL to assist in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement, especially the disarmament and demobilization process. However, in the present insecure and unstable conditions that prevail in Monrovia and throughout Liberia, there is little that UNOMIL can accomplish with respect to these objectives. At the same time, through the use of its good offices, UNOMIL continues to play an important role in supporting the efforts of ECOWAS to facilitate the resumption of the peace process. It can also facilitate, in consultation with ECOMOG, the adoption of confidence-building measures, with a view to creating conditions conducive to a return to the Abuja Agreement. I, therefore, recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIL for three months, until 31 August. During this period, UNOMIL's strength, which currently consists of 25 civilian and military personnel, would remain approximately at its present level, taking into account the possible need to increase or reduce the number slightly depending on the evolution of the security situation on the ground.

50. Following the ECOWAS Summit, I shall submit to the Security Council recommendations on the role, if any, that UNOMIL can play after 31 August. Evidently, those recommendations will depend on the decisions that ECOWAS will take regarding its own role in Liberia. They will also be contingent upon implementation by the faction leaders of the concrete steps necessary to restore basic law and order in Monrovia and elsewhere. These steps must begin with the strict observance of the cease-fire, the withdrawal of fighters from Monrovia, the deployment of ECOMOG throughout the city and the restoration of its status as a safe haven. Once these basic objectives have been achieved, steps should be taken to ensure that negotiations are initiated, under the auspices of ECOWAS and the United Nations, with a view to resolving those issues that were not fully addressed in the Abuja Agreement and elaborating a comprehensive implementation plan. The willingness of the faction leaders to engage in genuine negotiations and mutual accommodation will no doubt be a critical factor in determining the continued involvement of the international community in Liberia. The faction leaders should carefully ponder the lessons of Somalia in this regard.

51. Issues related to the security of UNOMIL and the humanitarian agencies in Liberia, as well as the return of looted equipment, will also have to be addressed. It is unlikely that the international community will be ready to re-engage itself in the peace process in Liberia until these issues are fully clarified and the factions provide sufficient guarantees for the safety and security of innocent civilians, as well as United Nations and other international personnel.

52. As regards UNOMIL, it will be recalled that, at the time of its establishment, it was clearly recognized that unarmed United Nations military observers would require the provision of security by ECOMOG in order to fulfil their mandated tasks. For well-known reasons, however, ECOMOG has not been able to provide the level of security necessary for UNOMIL personnel to function in Liberia, or to fulfil entirely its own responsibilities as a peace-keeping force. This was amply demonstrated by the events of the past few weeks.

Careful consideration will therefore have to be given in the coming weeks to finding ways and means of ensuring that these difficulties are effectively addressed.

53. The involvement of UNOMIL in Liberia marked the first time the United Nations had deployed a peace-keeping mission in parallel with that of a regional organization, in this case a subregional organization. I have stressed from the very beginning that the role foreseen for UNOMIL in Liberia was predicated upon the assumption that ECOMOG would be in a position to perform the wide-ranging tasks entrusted to it. Unfortunately, ECOMOG never received the manpower and resources necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities effectively. It would be an illusion to think that this innovative model of peace-keeping will be able to succeed in Liberia, especially under current conditions, unless sufficient and reliable sources of funding are provided to ECOMOG, and unless the force is strengthened and structured in a manner that will enable it to carry out its tasks as a professional peace-keeping force.

54. I commend ECOWAS and OAU for their continued efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process. I would also like to thank my Special Representative and the staff of UNOMIL for their continuing efforts, under very trying circumstances, to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

Annex I

Detailed account of the fighting in Monrovia between 6 and 29 April 1996

1. The fighting that began on 6 April 1996 quickly escalated and spread to central Monrovia. Thousands of civilians, including United Nations and other international personnel, were caught in the crossfire. More than 2,300 people were evacuated from the city with the assistance of the Government of the United States. UNOMIL and the United Nations agencies were forced to relocate a large number of personnel to neighbouring countries. As NPFL/ULIMO-K forces took control of many areas of the city, most of the combined ULIMO-J, LPC and AFL forces retreated to the AFL Barclay Training Centre barracks in the city centre, taking with them at gunpoint hundreds of civilians, including foreign nationals. Hundreds of other civilians voluntarily fled to the barracks, seeking refuge from hostile fighters. Conditions at the barracks were described as desperate, and civilians were apparently used as human shields to protect the barracks against NPFL/ULIMO-K attacks. About 50 ECOMOG soldiers were also held hostage.

2. While the ULIMO-J/LPC/AFL alliance has been referred to as the joint "Krahn forces", it should be noted that these factions, while predominately Krahn, include a number of other ethnic groups. Throughout the hostilities, Mr. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah have refused to negotiate directly with them, continuing to refer to their own fighters as "government forces", and to the ULIMO-J, LPC and AFL forces as criminal elements. For their part, some representatives of the ULIMO-J/LPC/AFL alliance took the view that the transitional Government had collapsed with the eruption of fighting in Monrovia and that no one should pretend to speak on its behalf until the question of governance was reviewed at the ECOWAS Summit. These contentious views impeded negotiations for a cease-fire.

3. When the fighting erupted, UNOMIL and ECOWAS, with the Ambassadors of Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the United States, formed a team to undertake intensive mediation efforts aimed at establishing a cease-fire and reactivating the peace process. On 11 April 1996, the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Rawlings of Ghana, dispatched a high-level delegation to Liberia, led by his National Security Adviser, Captain Kojo Tsikata. Working with the mediation team, the ECOWAS delegation reached agreement with Mr. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah on the terms of the cease-fire, the deployment of ECOMOG in Monrovia and around the Barclay Training Centre, the disarmament of fighters concentrated at the barracks, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need there and the withdrawal of fighters from the city. It was agreed that, following the implementation of these measures, the issues concerning General Johnson (which remained a major concern to Mr. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah), as well as ways and means of putting the peace process back on track, would be addressed. As agreed, the Cease-fire Violations Committee, chaired by UNOMIL, was immediately reactivated to monitor the cease-fire.

4. These measures resulted in a temporary halt in the shelling of the Training Centre by NPFL/ULIMO-K forces, enabling the mediation team to arrange a meeting, on 18 April, with representatives of ULIMO-J, LPC, AFL and civilians trapped at

the barracks. The Training Centre commanders agreed to the terms of the cease-fire, which went into effect on 19 April, and to the release of the hostages held at the barracks. Soon thereafter, some 226 foreign nationals and a number of Liberians were released. As fighters withdrew, ECOMOG began to deploy in the city. However, contrary to the agreement, NPFL remained deployed in the eastern section of the city and ULIMO-J maintained a presence outside the Training Centre barracks.

5. The cease-fire held, for the most part, as efforts to resolve the outstanding issues continued. The mediation team encouraged General Johnson to leave Liberia, at least temporarily, as a means of defusing tensions. He ultimately left Monrovia for Accra on 3 May, at the invitation of the Chairman of ECOWAS, to participate in the ECOWAS Summit scheduled for 8 May. In the meantime, Mr. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah insisted that government offices be reopened and that the Council of State begin to operate from the executive mansion, which ECOMOG had sealed off as a security precaution. The mediation team and the ECOMOG Field Commander advised them that this could provoke an attack from the Barclay Training Centre, as the executive mansion is within firing range of the barracks. The cease-fire broke down on 29 April when an attempted meeting of the Council of State, attended by Chairman Sankawulo together with Councilmen Taylor and Kromah, was cut short after fighting erupted between ULIMO-J and NPFL/ULIMO-K forces near the executive mansion.

6. The fighting rapidly escalated overnight into some of the worst fighting witnessed since the start of the civil war in December 1989. Hostilities soon spread throughout central Monrovia, as fighters who had withdrawn to outlying areas returned in large numbers, forcing ECOMOG to withdraw from the city centre.

Annex II

Composition of the military component of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

	At 5 April 1996	At 15 May 1996	
	Observers	Monrovia	On standby in Freetown
Bangladesh	15	-	3
China	7	-	-
Czech Republic	6	-	-
Egypt	11	3	-
Guinea-Bissau	3	-	-
India	9	2	2
Jordan	8	-	-
Kenya	11	-	1
Malaysia	9	-	2
Pakistan	8	-	2
Uruguay	6	-	-
Total	93	5	10

Map No. 3941 UNITED NATIONS
May 1996

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section


The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
UNOMIL
Deployment as of 15 May 1996
International boundary
County boundary
Regional boundary
UNOMIL team site
Mission Headquarters
National capital
Airport
0 20 40 60 80 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 mi
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
CÔTE D' IVOIRE
LIBERIA
Atlantic Ocean
Western Region
Northern Region
Eastern Region
LOFA
NIMBA
BONG
GRAND BASSA
GRAND GEDEH
RIVER CESS
SINOE
GRAND KRU
MARYLAND
MONTSERRADO
MARGIBI
GRAND CAPE MOUNT
BOMI
Monrovia
Robertsport
Buchanan
River Cess
Greenville
Barclayville
Harper
Saniquellie
Tchien (Zwedru)
Kola (Kola Town)
Gueckedou
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Kailahun
Pendembu
Vahun
Kenema
Gelahun
Zigida
Yelia
Zorzor
Nzérékoré
Yekepa
Danané
Pujehun
Kongo
Wiesua
Belle Yella
Gbange
Belefuanai
Gahnpa (Ganta)
Kahnple
Sulima
Bendaja
Bopolu
Tubmanburg
Gbarnga
Suakoko
Zienzu
Palala
Kpein
Sagleipie
Butlo
Zekera
Kpeaple
Toulepleu
Guiglo
Tapeta
Gbovi
Tobli
Poabli
Towabli (Towai Town)
Debli
Babu
Drubo (Dubwe)
Tai
Ghapo
Trade Town
Gonglee
Duabo
Galio
Pelokehn
Timbo
Bokoa
Shabli
Yakakahn
Yibuke (Kaobli)
Juarohn
Kopo
Tiehnpo
Tatuke
Sehnkwehn
Tawake
Kodeke
Nyaake
Nana Kru
Sasstown
Nemeke
Grand Cess
Plibo
Tabou
C. Palmas
Brewerville
Careysburg
Kakata
Riverview
Harbel
Marshall
Harttord
Edina
Guata
Map No. 3802 Rev. 17 UNITED NATIONS
May 1996
Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section